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Abstract
Security attacks are constantly on the rise leading to drastic consequences. Several secu-
rity services are required more than ever to prevent both passive and active attacks such as
Data Confidentiality (DC). A DC security service is typically based on a strong symmetric
cipher algorithm. However, some of today’s applications, such as real-time applications and
those running on constrained devices, require efficient lightweight cipher schemes that can
achieve a good balance between the security level and system performance. Recently, a set
of lightweight cryptographic algorithms has been proposed to that end, which is based on
a dynamic key approach. The dynamic structure enables the reduction of the number of
rounds to the minimum possible value of just one or two rounds, which minimizes the com-
putational overhead without degrading the security level. This paper follows the dynamic
key-dependent cipher logic and proposes a new flexible lightweight technique with or with-
out the reliance on the chaining mode of operation. Furthermore, the dynamic key changes
for each input message, which leads to different cipher primitives such as substitution and
permutation tables, in addition to round keys. Also, the proposed mode of operation is
based on the dynamic key approach whereby blocks are selected and mixed according to a
dynamic permutation table. Accordingly, different plaintext messages are encrypted differ-
ently while preserving the avalanche effect. Finally, we conduct security and performance
analysis to validate the efficiency and robustness of the proposed cipher scheme as compared
to traditional ciphers and to the recently proposed dynamic key-dependent ciphers.
Keywords: Lightweight flexible key-dependent cipher scheme, dynamic operation mode,
security and performance analysis.
1. Introduction
Emerging systems are more prone to security threats compared to traditional networks.
These systems are facing dangerous security and privacy issues through different attack types
that target various security services such as confidentiality (data confidentiality and privacy),
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integrity (device system integrity), availability (data and system), and authentication (de-
vice/user and data origin authentication). Therefore, two types of security solutions can be
used to ensure the required security services, cryptographic and/or non-cryptographic solu-
tions. Data confidentiality, data integrity, and source authentication are achieved mainly via
cryptographic algorithms.
1.1. Problem Formulation
Obviously, applications that transmit or store sensitive information must be well pro-
tected. Confidentiality is among the most dangerous passive threats mainly including eaves-
dropping and traffic analysis, where adversaries aim to extract the message itself, or any
useful information from communicated data.
However, the existing confidentiality solutions may not be suitable for delay-sensitive
systems [13]. Moreover, they are not practical within constrained devices with limited bat-
tery lifetime and limited computational power. Also, various emerging applications have
stringent QoS requirements. Relying on traditional security in these scenarios may cause an
overhead in terms of latency and resources, such as the case with AES [2] (Advanced En-
cryption Standard), which requires a large number of rounds resulting in a negative impact
on the corresponding system performance. Hence the need for a cryptographic algorithm
concept with low latency and required resources is a must. On the other hand, relying on
chaotic cryptographic algorithms as an alternative way is not possible since chaotic cryp-
tography requires floating-point computations, conversion of operations, in addition to finite
periodicity (1D-chaotic map) and complicated hardware implementation.
Accordingly, recent works shifted towards the design of a new cryptography class, known
as ”Lightweight” [13, 22].
A set of lightweight cryptographic algorithms that rely on the dynamic key approach
were presented by [14]-[19]. These approaches require a low number of rounds leading to the
reduction of the computational complexity whilst preserving a high-security level.
1.2. Motivation and Contributions
This paper addresses the problem of securing the exchange of information in order to over-
come confidentiality issues with low overhead and a small latency. We present a new efficient,
flexible, lightweight yet secure cipher algorithm that adopts the dynamic key-dependent ci-
pher concept. The proposed cipher uses a single round, which requires few operations and it
ensures a good cryptographic performance. To do that, a dynamic key is generated (or up-
dated) for each input message, which can be audio, image, video message, etc. This dynamic
key is produced as a function of a secret key and a secret dynamic Nonce. The dynamic key
approach makes the cryptographic primitives variable and unknown to any given attacker.
As a consequence, this introduces a high complexity for attackers. Moreover, the presented
technique of [16] is used to generate dynamic key-dependent substitution and permutation
2
tables based on the Key Setup Algorithm (KSA) of RC4 and the modified KSA. In addition,
these techniques ensure that the produced substitution and permutation tables can reach
the desirable cryptographic performance in a dynamic key-dependent manner.
The main goal of this work is to propose a design for an alternative cipher that has a
different structure than AES, and which addresses any possible weakness when used with
constrained devices or when dealing with applications that require a real-time response. As
such, in addition to security, the proposed scheme should exhibit the minimum possible delay
and computational complexity. Accordingly, we are proposing a cipher that uses the dynamic
key-dependent approach instead of the static one such as AES; this can achieve a high security
level with minimum operations. With the dynamic approach, all cipher primitives such as
substitution and permutation tables are unknown for the attackers and vary for each input
message (or for a threshold data size in case of small messages), which makes the attack
process extremely difficult. Moreover, the relation between the dynamic keys is independent
and non-invertible compared to the secret key. For example, this was the main idea during
the design of SHA3, which avoids the cryptographic concept of SHA1 and SHA2. In addition,
we try to reduce the trade-off between the security level and performance requirements in
the proposed scheme to respond better to tiny devices and real time requirements.
Our proposed cipher solution has several contributions in terms of security and system
performance, and they are listed next.
System performance
• Efficiency: Recent lightweight symmetric ciphers such as the Hummingbird2 require
at least 4 rounds as indicated in [16]. On the other hand, chaotic symmetric ciphers do
require floating-point calculations and conversion operations and they are based on the
multi-round structure. Our proposed cipher solution requires one simple round function
to encrypt 2 blocks at a time as compared to [7]. This requires two complete rounds of
substitution-diffusion operations in addition to chaining. The proposed cipher requires
fewer number of operations and avoids diffusion operations to reduce the required
computational complexity and required resources. Furthermore, [19] can be considered
an enhancement of [7] since only one substitution or diffusion operation is required for
each round (two rounds). However, this scheme uses a matrix diffusion operation,
which allows the cipher scheme to achieve better efficiency. The recent cipher scheme
of [16] was compared to related work to validate its effectiveness. The proposed cipher
scheme requires half the computational complexity (O(nb
2
)) compared to the recent
lightweight one round cipher scheme of [16] (O(nb)), where nb represents the number
of blocks in one input message and it is equal to d len
N
e. Note that len represents the
length of the input message after being reshaped to a vector form, and m represents
the block size (number of bytes in each message block).
Hence, the proposed cipher requires half the computational complexity and resources
compared to [16] with a similar security level. Moreover, the proposed cipher scheme
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without chaining (just encryption and decryption) can be realized in parallel, while the
encryption algorithm of the chaining variant cannot be parallelized. In summary, the
proposed cipher scheme strikes a very good balance between security and performance,
which is detailed in the following.
• Flexibility: The proposed cipher deals with a block that has a flexible length (N
bytes) that can be adjusted according to the device constraints and application.
• Simple hardware and software implementations: ”Exclusive OR” logical oper-
ations, with look-up substitution and permutation operations make the corresponding
HW (HardWare) and SW (SoftWare) implementations of the proposed cipher simple
and efficient.
• Error Tolerance: The proposed cipher scheme shows a better resistance against
channel errors compared to [7, 19] (see Section 6.1). The effect of any error in any
byte of any encrypted block will affect only two bytes on both mixed blocks, and at
the same block byte position. The error(s) will not affect the whole block due to
the avalanche effect being achieved differently with a new dynamic key for each input
message. However, the proposed cipher scheme with the chaining operation mode
doubles the error effect compared to the unchained one, but the effect of the corrupted
bytes is only limited to the bytes of the next blocks. Overall, the proposed cipher
scheme exhibits a lower error propagation compared to standard block ciphers such as
AES, which makes it useful for any error detection-correction scheme.
All these performance contributions lead to lower computational delay and resource re-
quirements for the proposed cipher in addition to simplifying its practical implementation
(HW/SW). Next, we will present the different security performance of the proposed cipher.
Security Performance
• Dynamic Key-Dependence Approach: The proposed cipher is based on dynamic
key-dependent cryptographic primitives (substitution and permutation tables in addi-
tion to round keys) which are changed in a dynamic pseudo-random manner for each
input message. The advantage is that the proposed approach uses the session key to
produce a set of dynamic keys. Consequently, statistical or implementation attacks will
be very challenging since different encrypted keys are being used with different physical
and logical properties [19, 7, 27, 23]. Note that we adopt two different substitution
tables instead of one to make the proposed cipher more secure.
• Dynamic Operation Mode: Traditional block ciphers use static operation mode
with a sequential order of blocks for encryption and decryption. The proposed cipher
scheme is based on the dynamic pseudo-random block selection operation via a dynamic
permutation table. This makes the relation between the encrypted blocks even more
random and complicated. Consequently, this reinforces its immunity against analytic
attacks since the encryption/decryption sequential order becomes dynamic and variable
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for each input message. Moreover, this operation exhibit lower latency and resources
overhead towards preserving the system performance advantages.
The security level and performance of the proposed cipher scheme were validated through
a set of security and performance tests.
The proposed solution can be also extended to provide an authenticated encryption
(AE) operation mode such as CCM [6] and GCM [5], which require two passes; the first
one for the authentication and the second one for the confidentiality. On the other hand,
other AE operation modes such as IAPM [11] and OCB [24] require only a single pass
for authentication and encryption. All these listed AE operation modes can ensure data
integrity, source authentication in addition to data confidentiality. However, within their
single or double pass(es), they rely on a block cipher that requires multiple rounds r such as
AES (10, 12 and 14 rounds for 128, 192 and 256 bits key length, respectively). Similarly, [10]
presents an authenticated encryption mode that requires a block cipher such as AES. When
compared against the optimized version of AES, the proposed cipher requires half the delay
and the required resources. Note that in this paper, we focus on a cipher scheme for data
confidentiality with dynamic operation modes such as ECB, CBC, and CTR, while relying
on a single round with a minimum number of operations. As a future work, the scheme will
be extended to provide an authentication operation mode that can achieve a significant gain
(one round) in a similar manner to data confidentiality.
1.3. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed key
derivation function in addition to the employed techniques to construct different cipher
primitives. In Section 3, the proposed cipher scheme with and without chaining is described
in detail as well as the concept of the dynamic mode of operation. Next, we analyze and
assess the security level of the proposed cipher scheme in Section 4. Then, in Section 5, we
prove the immunity of the proposed algorithm against different kinds of existing attacks. In
Section 6, the effectiveness of the proposed scheme is evaluated and confirmed. Finally, in
Section 7, the conclusions are drawn along with directions for future work.
2. Proposed Key Derivation Function
All the notations used in the following description are given in Table 1, and the proposed
dynamic key generation technique steps are shown in Figure 1. A shared secret session Key
(SK) between two legal entities, as well as a secret Nonce are considered as input for each
new session. The session key can then be renewed for each new session or depending on
the system’s configuration. However, the key management among legal entities (users or
devices) is not the focus of this paper. For more details about the possible key management,
readers can refer to [25].
For each new input message, a dynamic key (DK) is produced by hashing the secret key
SK with a Nonce that can be generated in a synchronous manner between legal entities.
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Figure 1: Proposed dynamic key derivation Function and construction cipher primitives
Since the hash function should be a secure keyed cryptographic hash function, in this paper,
HMAC [8] with SHA-512 is employed since it can provide better resistance against collision
and other desirable cryptographic performance. The output of this step is a dynamic key,
which has a length of 64 bytes.
DK = HMACSK(Nonce) (1)
Note that the Nonce changes frequently for each input message and thus, a different
dynamic key is produced for each input message compared to the previous or next message.
Then, the dynamic key is divided into five sub-keys DK = {kS1, kS2, kP , kRK , kSRK}
where each one has a length of 128 bits (16 bytes), except kS1 and kS2 that have a length
equal to 64 bits (8 bytes). These dynamic sub-keys are used for different purposes as they
are described below.
• Substitution sub-key kS1: it consists of the most significant 8 bytes of DK and is
used to construct the first substitution table S1 by using the key setup algorithm of
RC4 as described in [16]. Note that the substitution operation is done at the byte level
and that the elements in the table S1 have values between 0 and 255.
• Substitution sub-key kS2: it consists of the next most significant 8 bytes of DK and
is used to construct the second substitution table S2, as described previously.
• Permutation sub-key kP : it represents the next most significant 16 bytes of DK and
is used to construct a flexible permutation table pi of length nb by using the modified
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Table 1: Table of Symbols used
Symbol Definition
SK A shared secret Session Key
Nonce A dynamic Nonce and it is changed for each input message
DK A Dynamic Key and it is updated for each input message
kS Substitution sub-Key
Si i
th dynamic substitution table (256 elements)
kp Permutation sub-Key
pi Dynamic permutation table
kRK Seed for a stream cipher to produce RK
RK1 The first set of m dynamic round keys
RK2 The second set of m dynamic round keys
kSRK A selection Round Key and it is used to produce SRK
SRK a selection round key table and it is used to decide which round keys (from RK1
and RK2) are used for each input block encryption
len length of input message after reshaped to a table form.
nb Number of blocks in one input message and it is equal to d len
N
e
N Number of bytes in one block message
m Number of the different round keys generated
M The original message
mi The i
th original plain block
C The encrypted message
ci The i
th encrypted block
τ For applications with small-size messages, the update of the dynamic key and cipher
primitives are done after a certain configured data threshold length (τ)
l represents the maximum size of small-size messages
δ the size of a set of small-size messages and it is equal to b τ
l
c.
key setup algorithm of RC4, which was presented in [16]. The values of the elements
in the permutation table pi range from 1 to nb.
• Round Key generation sub-key kRK : this consists of the next most significant 16
bytes. This step can be realized in two different manners:
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1. PRNG variant: kRK is divided into two equal parts (kRK1 and kRK2) and the
length of each part is 8 bytes and each one is used as a seed for a stream cipher in
order to generate, for each iteration, two pseudo-random blocks (RK1 and RK2).
2. Pre-generate variant:kRK is used as a seed for an efficient stream cipher that
will be iterated to produce 2×m×N bytes keystream, which is divided into two
equal parts (m×N). As such, two sets ofm round keysRK1 = {RK1,1, . . . , RK1,m}
and RK2 = {RK2,1, . . . , RK2,m} are generated. Each RK1,j or RK2,j for
j = 1, 2, . . . , m has N bytes. These round keys can be generated using any
stream cipher. In this paper, the RC4 stream cipher [21] is used, with kRK as
a seed to produce 2 × m × N bytes key-stream. The first m × N is used to
form RK1, which consists of m round keys and each one having N bytes key-
stream. Similarly, the next m × N is used to form RK2. In addition, m is a
configured parameter and it can be selected according to the memory constraints.
The importance of this variant compared to the previous one is that the encryp-
tion/decryption process can be realized in parallel (with the proposed dynamic
Electronic-Code-Book (ECB) if parallel computation is possible). However, this
variant is suitable for a small message with only few blocks ≤ nb to maintain
security such that different pseudo-random blocks (RK1 and RK2) are used for
each input block and consequently, to avoid any randomness issue.
• Dynamic Round Key selection kSRK : this represents the least significant 16 bytes
of DK and is used to construct a Selection Round Key (SRK) table of length dnb/2e
and its corresponding values range from 1 to m. A possible technique to generate SRK
is by constructing an initial table with m elements Temp[i] = i for i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
Then, this table is repeated for dnb
m
e (copies of Temp) to have a length equals or
greater than nb and its values are preserved ranging from 1 to m. In fact, Temp after
repeated might it have a length greater than nb, so a truncation operation is required
to have only nb elements. Then, the modified KSA of RC4 [16] is iterated with kSRK to
construct a permutation table piSRK with
nb
2
elements. SRK is obtained by permuting
the repeated table Temp using the permutation table piSRK . The permuted Temp is
called SRK = Temp(piSRK) table. SRK is used to select the round key, which is used
to mix with a couple of input blocks in a non-linear manner.
In this scheme, any bit difference in the secret key or Nonce will provide a different
dynamic key. Therefore, the proposed cipher approach ensures a high key sensitivity since
all cipher primitives are related to the dynamic key.
At the legitimate destination, the inverse substitution S−1 table is required. For this
purpose, the original substitution S should be produced first in a similar manner to the
source side. Then, the inverse substitution table can be obtained using S according to the
following equation:
S−1[S[i]] = i for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 255 (2)
8
2.1. Adaptation of the Key Derivation Function for Low Data Rate Applications
Even though the proposed scheme is designed essentially for multimedia contents, yet
it can also be adapted for small messages (low data rate applications), as the scheme is
flexible and can be easily configured. For application with small-sized messages, the update
of the dynamic key and cipher primitives are not done for each input message and can be
performed after a certain configured data threshold length (τ) that can be considered as the
size of a set of small-sized messages (called δ), the dynamic key is updated and consequently
the cipher primitives. δ = b τ
l
c, and l represents the maximum size of small-sized messages.
In fact, δ is based on τ ; a low value of τ means a high level of security but requires more
overhead in terms of delay and resources.
On the other hand, for each δ small messages, we propose to update S1 in function of S2
and S2 in function of S1 after each message is encrypted. This will prevent attackers from
detecting any useful information about a repeated small message. The proposed update
substitution primitive after each message encryption is as follows:
Temp = S1
S1 =S1(S2 >> mod(it, 256))
S2 =S2(Temp)
(3)
where S2 >> v circularly shifts the values in the substitution table S2 by v elements.
Besides, it represents the counter update iteration and it is incremented by 1 after each
update time. This adaptation of the proposed key derivation function for low data rate
applications is to show that the proposed cipher can be also efficient for small-message
applications and to provide more information about its configuration.
3. Proposed Cipher Scheme
The proposed cipher can handle any type of data messages such as an image, video, audio
or text file. Also, the proposed cipher can be performed with or without chaining. First, the
proposed scheme is presented without chaining, and it can be considered as a dynamic ECB
mode (D-ECB) in order to avoid the issues associated with the static ECB mode [4]. This
is done by selecting the blocks to be encrypted in a dynamic pseudo-random order instead
of the typical sequential order. The block selection is based on a dynamic permutation table
that is derived from the dynamic key that changes for each input message. Moreover, we
perform a pseudo-random mixing of two blocks instead of one to increase the randomness of
the ciphertext and to make cryptanalysis even more difficult.
For each input message, a dynamic key is produced and accordingly, the different cipher
primitives are produced:
1. Two sets of m round keys RK1 and RK2;
2. A selection table SRK
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3. Two substitution tables (S1 and S2);
4. and permutation table (pi)
All these cipher primitives are required in the encryption algorithm (see Eq. 4 and 6).
These same primitives are used in the decryption process except for the substitution tables
that are replaced by their inverses, S−11 and S
−1
2 . The input message is padded if necessary
(nb should be even), and then, divided into nb blocks M = m1, m2, . . . , mnb. Moreover,
each block has a length of N bytes, where N is a configuration parameter and it can change
according to the application or device constraints. A lower value of N is preferable for
real-time applications.
3.1. Encryption/Decryption Algorithms
The proposed encryption algorithm consists of two sub-functions: BlocksSelection, and
RoundFunction(RF), which are described below.
3.1.1. Blocks Selection
The proposed cipher encrypts two input blocks in each iteration, (mpi(i+nb
2
) and mpi(i))
where i = {1 , 2, . . . , nb
2
}. Note that, mpi(i) represents the pi(i)th input block and both
input blocks are selected according to the dynamic permutation table pi. This complicates
the cryptanalysis since there is no sequential relationship between the mixed blocks and the
neighboring encrypted blocks. Then, the proposed round function RF is iterated on each
couple of input blocks (mpi(i+nb
2
) and mpi(i)).
3.1.2. Round Function RF
The round function uses both substitution tables S1 and S2 and the selection round key
table SRK in addition to two round keys (RK1 and RK2) that can be generated in a recur-
sive manner for each input block in the first variant of round key generation. While a set of
m round keys (RK1 and RK2) is generated at the initialization step in the second variant
of the round key generation. In fact, in the following, we present only the second variant.
However, a slight modification is needed when the first round key generation is used, which
is the use of the produced round keys RK1i and RK2i instead of RK1SRK(i) and RK2SRK(i),
respectively for the ith input block.
In each iteration, a couple of input blocks (mpi(i+nb
2
) and mpi(i)) are selected and encrypted
to produce two encrypted blocks (cpi(i) and cpi(i+nb
2
)) as shown in Eq. 4.
cpi(i) = S2(mpi(i) ⊕ S1(mpi(i+nb
2
) ⊕RK1SRK(i)))
cpi(i+nb
2
) = S1(S2(mpi(i) ⊕ cpi(i))⊕RK2SRK(i))
(4)
Note that the pi(i)th encrypted block Cpi(i) is obtained by mixing (xor) mpi(i+nb
2
) with the
SRK(i)th round key of RK1 (RK1SRK(i)). Then, its corresponding output is substituted
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using the first substitution table S1. Next, the substituted output is mixed with the pi(i)
th
message plain block mpi(i). Finally, another substitution is done on the output by using the
substituting S2 table.
On the other hand, the pi(i + nb
2
) encrypted block Cpi(i+nb
2
) is obtained by mixing (xor)
Cpi(i) with the pi(i)
th message block mpi(i), followed by applying the substitution operation on
this output by using S2. Then, its corresponding output is mixed with the SRK(i)
th round
key of RK2 (RK2SRK(i)). Finally, the output is substituted by using S1.
As seen previously, the mixing between blocks depends on the permutation table pi that
changes for each input message. As such, all blocks will be encrypted similarly to form
the encrypted message C, which will be transmitted securely to the desired destination
or to securely stored locally. The encryption algorithm of the first variant is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed One Round Encryption Algorithm without Chaining Operation
mode.
1: procedure One Round Encryption(X)
2: for i = 1 to nb
2
do
3: cX[pi[i]] = S2(S1(X[pi[i]]⊕RK1[SRK[i]])⊕X[pi[i+ nb2 ]])
4: cX[pi[i+ nb
2
]] = S1(S2(X[pi[i+
nb
2
]]⊕ cX[pi[i]])⊕RK2[SRK[i]]))
5: end for
6: end procedure
The decryption algorithm differs only by using the inverse round function RF−1 that has
the reverse order of the round function. Moreover, RF−1 uses the inverse substitution tables
S−11 and S
−1
2 . In the following, RF
−1 is described:
mpi(i) = S
−1
2 (S
−1
1 (cpi(i+nb
2
))⊕RK2SRK(i))⊕ cpi(i)
mpi(i+nb
2
) = S
−1
1 (S
−1
2 (cpi(i))⊕mpi(i))⊕RK1SRK(i)
(5)
3.2. Proposed cipher scheme with chaining mode of operation
The second variant of the proposed cipher scheme uses a chaining mode of operation.
Two initial vectors are required for this variant IV 1 and IV 2. They may be initialized to
zeros (all bytes are equal to 0) for the first couple of blocks and then updated as presented
in the following equation:
cpi(i) = S2(mpi(i) ⊕ S1(mpi(i+nb
2
) ⊕ IV 1⊕RK1SRK(i)))
cpi(i+nb
2
) = S1(S2(mpi(i) ⊕ IV 2⊕ cpi(i))⊕RK2SRK(i))
IV 1 = cpi(i)
IV 2 = cpi(i+nb
2
)
(6)
The encryption algorithm of the second variant is described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 The proposed One Round Encryption Algorithm with Chaining Operation
mode.
1: procedure One Round Encryption(X, IV 1, IV 2)
2: for i = 1 to nb
2
do
3: cX[pi[i]] = S2(S1(X[pi[i]]⊕ IV 1⊕RK1[SRK[i]])⊕X[pi[i+ nb2 ]])
4: cX[pi[i+ nb
2
]] = S1(S2(X[pi[i+
nb
2
]]⊕ IV 2⊕ cxi)⊕RK2[SRK[i]]))
5: IV 1← X[pi[i]]
6: IV 2← X[pi[i+ nb
2
]]
7: end for
8: end procedure
Similarly to the first variant, the decryption algorithm uses the inverse round function
RF−1 with chaining operation mode as presented in the following equation:
mpi(i) = S
−1
2 (S
−1
1 (cpi(i+nb
2
))⊕RK2SRK(i))⊕ cpi(i) ⊕ IV 2
mpi(i+nb
2
) = S
−1
1 (S
−1
2 (cpi(i))⊕mpi(i))⊕RK1SRK(i) ⊕ IV 1
IV 1 = cpi(i)
IV 2 = cpi(i+nb
2
)
(7)
The second variant can be considered as a Dynamic Cipher Block Chaining (D-CBC)
since the chaining operation, in addition of the selection and mixing, are based on the dy-
namic permutation table. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that proposes a
dynamic CBC mode with dynamic block selection and mixing. The importance of this solu-
tion is that it further complicates and randomizes the relationship among encrypted blocks.
This leads to a higher level of randomness and makes it more immune against attacks.
3.3. Comparison Between Cipher Variants
The proposed cipher without the chaining operation can be executed in parallel, which is
not possible with the the chaining variant. As such, the encryption scheme without chaining
ensures a minimum encryption latency. However, parallel decryption is possible for both
variants. Moreover, the chained scheme requires just an additional ”exclusive or” operation
for each encrypted block compared to the unchained variant. Therefore, the second variant
requires a slightly longer execution time, as shown in Figure 14, compared to the encryption
scheme without the chaining operation for N ≤ 50.
Moreover, the security level of the chaining operation mode is higher due to its higher level
of randomness. Also, the chaining variant that is associated with a dynamic permutation
table makes the relation between input blocks more complicated. Table 2 presents a short
comparison between the proposed cipher scheme with or without chaining.
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Figure 2: (a) Original Lenna images (a) gray, (b) color, and (c) pepper image. The corresponding PDF of
original images (d)-(f), respectively.
Table 2: Comparison between the proposed approach with and without chaining
Metric Without Chaining With chaining
Error propagation + ++
Parallel encryption Yes No
Parallel decryption Yes Yes
Delay Lower one More delay
Randomness + ++
Robustness (makes the relation among input
blocks more complicated)
+ ++
4. Security Analysis
A cipher scheme is considered to be secure and strong, if it can resist implementation-
related and analytic attacks such as statistical, differential, chosen/known plaintext/ciphertext,
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Figure 3: The corresponding encrypted images using the proposed cipher without chaining (a), (b), and (c)
in addition to their corresponding PDF (d)-(f), respectively.
in addition to brute-force attacks [20, 26]. In this section, the high level of immunity of the
proposed scheme against these attacks is demonstrated. The Lenna and pepper standard
images are used as input messages (bytes) for all security and performance tests and for N =
16.
4.1. Statistical Analysis
Statistical attacks benefit from a weak level of randomness and uniformity. Therefore,
to guard against statistical attacks, the ciphertext should exhibit high randomness and uni-
formity levels. Several statistical tests were presented in [16] and they were carried out on
the obtained ciphertext to validate the uniformity and randomness levels such as Probability
Density Function (PDF) and entropy analysis to assess the uniformity, while the recurrence
and correlation coefficient between plain and encrypted messages are used to analyze the
randomness and the independence property.
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Figure 4: Encrypted Lenna images (a) gray, (b) color, and (c) pepper image with the proposed cipher with
chaining operation mode and their corresponding PDF (d)-(f), respectively.
4.1.1. Uniformity Analysis
To resist statistical attacks such as frequency attacks, the ciphertext should satisfy the
uniformity property. This means that the frequency of all symbols in the encrypted mes-
sage should be very close to a uniform distribution; each symbol should have an occurrence
probability close to 1
n
, where n represents the symbols’ space and it is equal to 8 for byte
messages. This can be justified visually and statistically. Visually, it can be proved by
plotting the PDF of the encrypted message. The PDF of standard original images and their
corresponding encrypted ones are shown in Figure 2, 3, and 4. The visual results clearly
indicate that the PDFs of the encrypted images follow the uniform distribution and all sym-
bols have an occurrence probability close to 1
256
= 0.039. Moreover, the cipher scheme with
chaining operation achieves a better level of uniformity compared to the unchained variant
as seen in Figure 3, and 4.
Moreover, the entropy test at the block level, as described in [16], is used to validate
this result. The uniformity at the block level is satisfied if its corresponding entropy value
is close to log2(N), which is the desired value according to [16]. Figure 5 represents the
variation of the entropy values for the encrypted Lenna image at the block level using a
random key and using 256 bytes as input block lengths for N = 16. According to the
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obtained entropy results, the encrypted blocks always have an entropy close to the desired
value (8). Numerical statistical results of the entropy tests are presented in Table 3, which
confirm that the uniformity property is achieved.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Variation of the entropy versus its corresponding block index for the encrypted Lenna image using
the proposed cipher (a) without and (b) with chaining operation at the block level (256-byte length) and for
a random dynamic key with N = 16, respectively.
4.1.2. Randomness Analysis
A high level of randomness should exist in the encrypted message. In order to quantify
the randomness level, two different tests can be applied: i) the correlation between adjacent
elements or ii) the difference between the original and encrypted messages. To quantify
the correlation among adjacent bytes, 2, 000 couples of adjacent bytes from the original and
encrypted images were selected and in all possible directions (horizontal, vertical and diago-
nal). The correlation between encrypted adjacent elements is uniformly distributed in space,
which is not the case of the original image as can be seen in Figure 6. In addition, the corre-
lation coefficient of adjacent elements of the encrypted ”Lenna” image in horizontal, vertical
and diagonal directions versus 1,000 random keys is shown in Figure 7 and all values are
very low and close to 0. This indicates that the proposed scheme (with or without chaining)
eliminates the spatial redundancy.
On the other hand, the difference test, which quantifies the percentage of the difference
between original and encrypted messages should be close to 50% at the bit level. Figure 8
shows the difference between the original and encrypted Lenna images. Table 3 contains
numerical statistical results of the difference tests. All these results clearly indicate that
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Figure 6: Correlation of adjacent pixels in original gray Lenna: (a) horizontally, (b) vertically and (c)
diagonally. Correlation in adjacent pixels in ciphered Lenna with a random dynamic key:(d) horizontally,
(e) vertically and (f) diagonally.
the proposed cipher achieves the required independence between original and encrypted
messages.
4.1.3. Statistical tests with TestU01 and ”practrand”
The proposed cipher with either PRNG or pre-generated round keys (RK1 and RK2) has
been tested with 100 different secret keys with TestU01 [12] and ”practrand” [3]. The D-ECB
with PRNG variant in addition to both variants of D-CBC (with PRNG or pre-generated
round keys) passed successfully all the randomness tests of ”TestU01” and ”practrand” with
all the tested keys: an all zeros message (all byte elements are equal to zero) of size 512 ×
512 was used. The two tests are very challenging randomness tests and hence, they confirm
the high randomness level of the produced ciphertext.
4.2. Sensitivity Test
The sensitivity test is used to validate the avalanche effect of the message and the key.
These tests are done to quantify the difference percentages between the encrypted messages
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 7: Variation of the correlation coefficient of adjacent pixels in ciphered gray Lenna images:(a) hori-
zontally, (b) vertically and (c) diagonally, respectively using the proposed scheme without Chaining.
when one bit differs in the original message or in the secret (also dynamic) key. The desired
value is 50% difference at the bit level.
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(a) Without Chaining (b) With Chaining
Figure 8: Difference between original and encrypted images against 1,000 random dynamic keys for the
proposed cipher without (a) and with (b) chaining operation mode.
(a) Without Chaining (b) With Chaining
Figure 9: key sensitivity against 1,000 random dynamic keys for the proposed cipher without (a) and with
(b) chaining operation mode.
19
4.2.1. Key Sensitivity Test
Figure 9 shows the dynamic key sensitivity for 1,000 random dynamic keys, and Table 3
shows the numerical statistical results for both cipher variants. According to the results, the
difference between both encrypted messages is very close to the desired value. Consequently,
this indicates that the proposed cipher scheme satisfies the required level for key sensitivity.
Moreover, a visual example is shown in Figure 10 for a decrypted gray and colored Lenna
images with a one-bit difference in the dynamic key. Consequently, the decrypted image with
incorrect dynamic key (one-bit difference) carries no useful information about the original
image. This justifies that any slight modification in the secret key or in the dynamic key
will lead to a different decrypted image that does not contain any useful information about
the original message.
4.2.2. Message Sensitivity Test
Since the proposed cipher is based on the dynamic key-dependence approach, the dynamic
key changes for each input message. Hence, the same message will be encrypted under
different dynamic keys. Thus, different encrypted messages will be obtained and with a
difference close to 50% as seen in Figure 9. As such, the proposed cipher satisfies the message
sensitivity (avalanche effect) by benefiting from the dynamic key approach. Finally, the
proposed cipher, with or without chaining, achieves the required message and key sensitivity.
4.3. Visual Degradation
The authors in[16, 19] use PSNR and SSIM metrics (discussed in [9]) to quantify the
visual degradation between original and encrypted images. Figure 11 shows the variation of
PSNR and SSIM between the original and the encrypted Lenna images versus 1, 000 random
dynamic keys. The PSNR has always low values between [9.18, 9.2749] with a mean equals
to 9.25 dB and this indicates that encrypted images exhibit hard degradation. In addition,
the SSIM values also validate the PSNR results and they are low and vary within [0.0289,
0.043], which is very low and close to zero. Accordingly, no useful visual information about
the original image could be revealed from the encrypted image.
5. Analytic, Brute force, and Implementation Attacks
Furthermore, the cipher operation is dynamic since two blocks are randomly selected and
mixed in each iteration as opposed to the sequential selection process in traditional ciphers.
The selection of input blocks (and chained block in case of the cipher scheme with chaining
operation) is based on a dynamically generated pseudo-random permutation table. Moreover,
high levels of randomness and uniformity are achieved in the proposed cipher according to
Figure 6, 7, 3 and 4, respectively. This indicates that statistical attacks cannot recover any
useful information from the ciphertext. Moreover, the independence between original and
encrypted messages is validated according to Figure 8. In addition, the proposed cipher
scheme uses two different dynamic substitution tables (S1 and S2) in a dynamically mixed
manner for each input image to increase the non-linearity between original and encrypted
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 10: Decrypted gray and color Lenna image using the proposed scheme (without CBC chaining) with
its corresponding correct dynamic key (a) and (c) respectively, and with one bit error in the dynamic key
used (b) and (d).
blocks. This makes the linear attacks really difficult to be realized. Also, introducing the
dynamic chaining operation mode complicates further the relation between input and original
messages. The required secret key sensitivity is satisfied since a secure keyed hash function
is used and it ensures a high resistance against collision, so the probability to produce the
same dynamic key is really close to 1
2512
. Moreover, the dynamic key sensitivity is confirmed
according to Figure 9. Hence, the key-related attacks are also very hard to be realized.
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: Histogram of the obtained PSNR and SSIM (between the original and the encrypted Lenna
images) for 1, 000 dynamic keys using the proposed scheme without the operation mode.
Furthermore, since the dynamic key changes for each input message, along a high level of
randomness, uniformity, and key sensitivity, differential attacks become very complicated
and difficult to succeed. On the other hand, each collected encrypted message is encrypted
differently with a different dynamic key and consequently, with different cipher primitives.
This makes the proposed cipher extremely hard to break by any analytic, or implementation
attack. All analytic attacks are unable to break the dynamic cipher scheme since they are
designed to break static ciphers with static cipher primitives, which is not the case of the
proposed cipher scheme. Finally, the size of the secret key can be 128, 196, or 256 bits, the
size of the Nonce is 512 bits, and the size of the dynamic key is 512 bits; these sizes are large
enough to make brute force attacks unfeasible.
As a conclusion, the proposed cipher is immune against the different well-known attacks
and possibly future ones and its line of defense is based on the dynamic key-dependence
approach coupled with a dynamic mode of operation.
6. Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed cipher scheme towards quan-
tifying its effectiveness. Two important metrics are presented in detail, the effect of error
propagation and the associated latency.
6.1. Effect of error propagation
The proposed cipher without chaining can be considered as a dynamic ECB mode. The
effect of any bit error in the encrypted block ci will be constrained only to the corresponding
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Table 3: Statistical results of the proposed cipher with and without chaining operation using gray Lenna
image and for 1,000 random keys.
Proposed Scheme Without Chaining Operation
Min Mean Max Std
Dif 49.9005 50.0002 50.1251 0.0360
KS 49.8378 49.9992 50.1372 0.0464
HE 7.1405 7.1487 7.1550 0.0021
ρh -0.0467 -0.0003 0.0532 0.0156
ρv -0.0503 -0.0001 0.0625 0.0153
ρd -0.0470 -0.0005 0.0513 0.0161
PSNR 9.1881 9.2311 9.2749 0.0132
SSIM 0.0289 0.0359 0.0422 0.0019
Proposed Scheme With Chaining Operation
Min Mean Max Std
Dif 49.8932 50.0000 50.1034 0.0353
KS 49.8931 49.9999 50.1055 0.0351
HE 7.1708 7.1750 7.1811 0.0017
ρh -0.0573 -0.0005 0.0461 0.0158
ρv -0.0448 -0.0001 0.0472 0.0157
ρd -0.0518 -0.0006 0.0518 0.0166
PSNR 9.1988 9.2307 9.2645 0.0093
SSIM 0.0304 0.0359 0.0420 0.0017
bytes in the mixed couple of decrypted blocks (mi and mpi(i)). Moreover, ECB limitations
and the trade-off between the avalanche effect and local block error propagation are avoided
in the proposed scheme by using the dynamic key approach. Furthermore, the advantage of
the proposed cipher is that it limits the effect of error to a byte instead of the whole block as
is the case with the traditional block cipher [4], due to the required avalanche effect property.
Concerning the proposed cipher with chaining, any bit(s) error in the encrypted block
ci, will affect four bytes in four different blocks (one byte for each block) (mpi(i), mpi(i+nb
2
),
mpi(i+1), and mpi(i+nb
2
+1)). This variant doubles the effect of error propagation compared to
the non-chaining one. However, this effect is low as the proposed cipher limits the effect to
its corresponding byte instead of block (N bytes). Compared to the original CBC, the effect
of any bit error is N + 1 bytes, where N is the corresponding erroneous block and 1 is the
byte in the next neighboring block.
In Figure 13, the effect of errors at the bit level (uniform random distribution within the
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(a) 5% (b) 15% (c) 30%
(d) 5% (e) 15% (f) 30%
Figure 12: Decrypted images in function of different errors percentage using the proposed scheme without
(a)-(d) or with (e)-(h) chaining operation mode.
encrypted image) on the proposed cipher scheme with and without chaining are shown. The
impact of errors on the proposed cipher scheme is low compared to traditional block ciphers
with ECB, CBC or CFB, which exhibit a high error propagation rate (2% of random uniform
errors are sufficient to destroy image). Also, visual results of the decrypted noisy images are
shown in Figure 12. The effect of errors on the visual degradation of the proposed scheme
is shown in Figure 13. The results confirm a low error propagation and consequently, low
visual degradation.
When comparing the recent dynamic key-dependent cipher solutions such as [7, 19],
we can see that a bit error in any byte of the encrypted block Ci, will affect three blocks
{ ˆmi−1, mˆi, ˆmi+1} in the decrypted message. Two of them {mˆi, ˆmi+1} have random bit
errors that occur independently in any bit position with an expected probability of 1
2
and
the third block ˆmi−1 has only one specific bit error in the same bit-error position. However,
for the proposed scheme without chaining, a bit error introduces only a bit error at the
same corresponding byte position for the both mixed blocks, which is equal to the presented
solution of [16]. However, with the chaining operation, the error effect is doubled but in
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 13: The average variation of the PSNR and SSIM of the proposed cipher scheme versus the
percentage of errors.
parallel the randomness and security levels are increased. Actually, for both variants, this
result clearly indicates that the proposed cipher exhibits low error propagation compared to
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the recent dynamic key-dependent cipher schemes.
6.2. Computational Delay
The main objective of the proposed cipher approach is to reach a high level of security
with the minimum number of operations. The objective is to reduce the computational
complexity, latency and resources (especially energy) for the data confidentiality process.
The required delay of the proposed cipher, with and without chaining, is presented and
quantified. To assess the total associated delay, we quantify several delays as follows:
1. TS denotes the required substitution execution time for a block of N bytes.
2. Txor denotes the required ”exclusive-or” execution time between two blocks of N bytes.
3. TSl denotes the required time to select a couple of input blocks
Therefore, the total Computational Delay (CD) of the proposed scheme with and without
chaining to encrypt two blocks is:
CDD−ECB = 4× TS + 4× Txor + TSl (8)
CDD−CBC = 5× TS + 6× Txor + TSl (9)
while the total computation delay of the standard AES in [2] to encrypt one block is:
CDAES = rTS + (r + 1)Txor + (r − 1)TD + rTSR (10)
where TD represents the required delay for the AES Mix-column operations (for all 4 columns)
and which has a very high delay compared to other AES operations. TSR represents the re-
quired delay for the AES “Shift-rows” operations and r represents the number of rounds. The
minimum value of r is 10 for 128 bits secret key, and hence, the minimum AES computation
delay is given by:
CDAES(r=10) = 10TS + 11Txor + 9TD + 10TSR (11)
Consequently, the AES computation delay is larger compared to the proposed one with
or without chaining. In addition, the proposed solution avoids diffusion operations such as
mix-columns of AES towards reducing the required delay. Accordingly, the proposed scheme
requires less computational complexity compared to the AES standard cipher for 128-bit
length secret key. In fact, AES for 192 and 256 bits secret keys, r is equal to 12 and 14,
respectively, and they also require more execution time compared to a 128-bit secret key.
Moreover, the required computational delays of the key derivation function and construc-
tion of cipher primitives are described and quantified below. To assess the total associated
delay, we quantify several delay components as follows:
1. TH denotes the required hash time for a block of N bytes.
2. TKSA denotes the required RC4-KSA execution time.
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Figure 14: Throughput in megabytes computed with the average execution times (10000 times) of encryption
of the color Lenna image (512 × 512 × 3) for the 3 variants of our approach with size of N ranging from 4
to 256 on (a) Raspberry Pi0 and (b) Raspberry Pi3.
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Figure 15: Throughput in megabytes computed with the average execution times (10000 times) of encryption
for the 3 variants of our approach compared to encryption for 2 AES variants for message sizes ranging from
1024 to 262144, with N = 256 on (a) Raspberry Pi0 and (b) Raspberry Pi3.
3. TMKSA(x) denotes the required execution time of the modified KSA of RC4 for a table
with x elements.
4. TPRNG denotes the required execution time of the Pseudo-Random Number Generation
of RC4.
CDKDF = Txor + TH + 3× TKSA + TMKSA(nb) + TMKSA(m) + TPRNG (12)
27
1024 4096 16384 65536 262144
Buffer size
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
Ra
tio
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 A
ES
 C
TR
 e
nc
D-ECB PRNG Enc
D-CBC PRNG Enc
D-CBC RK Enc
(a)
1024 4096 16384 65536 262144
Buffer size
1.50
1.55
1.60
1.65
1.70
1.75
1.80
1.85
Ra
tio
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 A
ES
 C
TR
 e
nc
D-ECB PRNG Enc
D-CBC PRNG Enc
D-CBC RK Enc
(b)
Figure 16: Gain of using our approach compared to AES CTR with N = 256 on (a) Raspberry Pi0 and (b)
Raspberry Pi3.
RC4 is a simple stream cipher, which exhibits a low computational delay and it is being
used to construct the cipher primitives such as substitution and permutation tables in addi-
tion to round keys. However, it will still introduce a negative effect for small-sized messages,
and this is the reason for adopting a different key derivation function for the case of low
data rate applications. In such a case, we update the dynamic key and cipher primitives
after δ small-sized messages (which is depending on τ threshold data bytes. In addition,
all cipher primitives are constant, except the two substitution tables (S1 and S2) that are
updated after each encrypted message. Therefore, the proposed solution is independent of
the message size but depends on the configurable threshold data length. Decreasing τ leads
to increase in the security level and the required delay and resources and vice-versa. Finally,
δ can be configured according to the application context and the required security level.
6.3. Experiments on Raspberry Pi
The proposed cipher with the dynamic operation modes (ECB and CBC) was imple-
mented in C, and the round keys are generated based on a PRNG or by pre-generating two
sets of round keys RK1 and RK2 before encryption/decryption process, as described previ-
ously. As such, four variants are possible, D-ECB using PRNG, D-ECB using pre-generated
round keys, D-CBC using PRNG and D-CBC using pre-generated round keys. In fact, ECB
with pre-generated round keys was not considered because this variant failed the ”TestU01”
and ”practrand” randomness tests.
The other variants that passed the randomness tests are D-CBC with PRNG or with
two set of round keys in addition to D-ECB with PRNG. These variants are analyzed and
compared to the optimized AES of OpenSSL on two Raspberry Pi devices (Raspberry Pi0,
and Raspberry Pi3).
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Figure 14 shows the throughput of the proposed approaches when using Raspberry Pi
devices and the colored Lenna image, of size 512× 512× 3, as input image versus different
sizes of N . According to the obtained results, lower execution time is required as N increases.
Therefore, a higher value of N is preferable for real-time IoT applications. Moreover, it can
be seen that the best block size is N = 256.
The experiment results in Figure 15 show that the proposed approaches outperform the
OpenSSL implementations of AES with the CBC and the CTR modes. It should be noted
that OpenSSL uses optimized assembly instructions towards decreasing the required delay.
On the Raspberry Pi0, the fastest variant algorithm was the D-ECB PRNG while on the two
other Raspberry Pi, it was D-CBC with pre-generated round keys. In general, both versions
of D-CBC have quite similar execution times.
The throughput ratio between the proposed cipher variants and AES-CTR are presented
in Figure 16 for different classes of Raspberry Pi. It represents the gain of using the proposed
cipher variants instead of using the optimized AES-CTR. These results indicate clearly that
the proposed variants require at least half of the AES-CTR execution time.
On the other hand, devices like Raspberry (Pi0 and Pi3) or Arduino are not suitable for
AES to achieve the best performance due to their limited processing capabilities. In general,
the majority of tiny devices, requires a solution similar to the proposed solution. This paper
addresses this issue and provides to that end an efficient cipher solution.
Table 4: Throughput of AES, SPECK and SIMON ciphers [1], One round of [16] and the proposed ones
(D-ECB and D-CBC) versus different Raspberry Pi devices
Cipher(Key size, block size) Raspberry Pi0 Raspberry Pi2 Raspberry Pi3
AES-CTR(128,128) 1.90e+07 2.44e+07 6.22e+07
Speck (256, 128) 1.46e+07 1.36e+07 2.81e+07
Speck (64, 32) 5.32e+06 5.49e+06 9.25e+06
Simon (256, 128) 4.99e+06 4.99e+06 9.98e+06
Simon (64, 32) 4.1e+06 4.14e+06 7.4e+06
Encryption One round [16] 2.43e+07 3.96e+07 7.13e+07
Proposed One (D-ECB PRNG) 4.19e+07 5.47e+07 9.24e+07
Proposed One (D-CBC with PRNG) 3.79e+07 4.95e+07 8.62e+07
Proposed One (D-CBC with pre-
generated round keys)
3.73e+07 4.97e+07 8.73e+07
The throughput values of the proposed cipher variants and related ciphers are presented
in Table 4 for different classes of Raspberry Pi. In addition, Table 5 represents the ratio
between Speck, Simon [1] and the proposed cipher with D-ECB variant. According to the
results, Simon requires less execution time compared to Speck. Simon and Speck require at
least 6.5 and 9 times overhead compared to the proposed cipher with D-ECB variant. This
indicates clearly that the proposed cipher achieves good performance compared to these
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Table 5: Ratio between the proposed cipher with D-ECB compared to Speck and Simon.
Cipher(Key size, block size) Raspberry Pi0 Raspberry Pi2 Raspberry Pi3
Speck (256, 128) 34.85 24.96 30.42
Speck (64, 32) 12.70 10.04 10.01
Simon (256, 128) 11.91 9.13 10.80
Simon (64, 32) 9.76 7.56 8.01
ciphers. Moreover, the throughput of the proposed one is increased by a factor of 72%,
38% and 29% compared to the previous one of [16] with Raspberry Pi0, Raspberry Pi2, and
Raspberry Pi3, respectively.
Moreover, let us indicate that the proposed variant D-CBC reduces the throughput com-
pared to the D-ECB with a factor between 7% and 10%. Independent of D-CBC delay
overhead, both variants achieve high throughput compared to AES, SPECK, SIMON [1]
and [16] according to Table 5.
As a conclusion, the proposed cipher scheme (with or without chaining) achieves low error
propagation and requires less delay compared to the existing cryptographic algorithms [1, 16]
according to Table 4, which makes it a good candidate for limited devices and for real-time
applications.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
The existing secure standard symmetric ciphers are based on a static multi-round function
structure that is iterated for a large number of rounds to achieve the desired security level.
This introduces a trade-off between the security level and performance. The target of this
paper is to solve this issue by designing an efficient cipher scheme that can achieve the
required security level with minimum possible operations. As such, in this paper, we present a
new efficient cipher scheme with low delay and computational resources. The main innovation
of this work is based on a simple secure one round function and by adopting the dynamic
operation mode such as ECB and CBC. The selection of two blocks (and previous ones for
CBC operation mode) for each iteration is done according to a dynamic permutation table.
This cipher solution is suitable for constrained devices and real-time applications. A set
of security and performance tests were performed on the proposed cipher (with or without
chaining) to prove its efficiency and its robustness against attacks.
This work will be extended in the future to realize an authentication-encryption opera-
tion mode with one single pass and also with a single round that requires low computational
complexity and resources. This ensures data integrity and source authentication in addition
to data confidentiality with low delay and resources overhead.
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